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The relationships between trade facilitation, trade flows, and capacity building are 
complex and challenging to assess, both empirically and in implementation.  This paper 
measures and estimates the relationship between trade facilitation and trade flows in 
manufactured goods in 2000-2001 in global trade, considering four important categories:  
port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment,  and service sector 
infrastructure.  A gravity model is employed to estimate this relationship across 75 
countries.  The results suggest that both imports and exports for a country and for the 
world will increase with improvements in these trade facilitation measures.  The gains 
from trade facilitation are predicted by using a simulation method, and compared across 
geographical regions, trade facilitation categories and who is undertaking reforms 
(domestic or partners).  The total gain in trade flow in manufacturing goods from trade 
facilitation improvements in all the four areas is estimated to be $377 billion; all regions 
gain in imports and exports.  Most regions gain more in terms of exports than imports, in 
large part through increasing exports to the OECD market.  The most important 
ingredient in getting these gains, particularly to the OECD market, is the country’s own 
trade facilitation efforts.  
 
   3
1. Introduction 
 
The relationships between trade facilitation, trade flows, and capacity building are 
complex and challenging, to assess empirically and in implementation.  Even the first 
step—relating trade facilitation and trade flows—encounters the problem of definition 
and measurement of trade facilitation.  However, as tariffs come down, assessing how 
other factors affect trade has increasing policy relevance.  Once trade facilitation is 
defined and measured, the challenge is to estimate its effects on trade flows.  A country’s 
trade will change not only through its own trade facilitation reforms, but also the reforms 
of its trading partners.  Differences in the relative magnitude of trade facilitation efforts 
on trade, as calculated by category of trade facilitation effort or group of trading partners, 
could point to negotiating and capacity building focus.  This paper measures and 
estimates the relationship between trade facilitation and trade flows,  considering the 
relationships from a variety of perspectives.  The hope is that the outcome will help 
inform policy decisions and capacity building choices.     
 
Empirical research on the issue of trade facilitation faces three challenges:  
defining and measuring trade facilitation; choosing a modeling methodology to estimate 
the importance of trade facilitation for trade flows; and designing a scenario to estimate 
the effect of improved trade facilitation on trade flows.   
 
•  It is important to define and measure trade facilitation with the objectives in mind of 
informing policy and aiding capacity building.  Accordingly, we consider four aspects 
of trade facilitation effort:  ports, customs, regulations, and e-business (which is a 
proxy for the service sectors of telecommunications and financial intermediation, 
which are key for all types of trade).  Simply benchmarking a country’s condition in 
these four areas with respect to the global average and best practice yields insights for 
capacity building and policy attention.       
 
•  The modeling methodology is particularly important because it has to account for the 
fact that both export and import trade flows will be affected by trade facilitation 
efforts, and that the effect of trade facilitation will differ depending on the trading 
patterns of the countries being examined.  Accordingly, we include trade facilitation 
measures for countries as importers and as exporters.  Investigating the stability of the 
estimated relationship across directions of trade (north-south, south-south) adds 
insight on which measures may be most important for addressing capacity building.    
 
•  The scenario design needs to account for differences among countries relative to best 
practice.  Accordingly, we consider scenarios where each country improves toward 
best practice by a country-specific amount.      
 
So as to assist in policy design and capacity building, the presentation of results 
allows a country to judge the potential outcome of trade facilitation efforts unilaterally, 
by region, and multilaterally.  Since each country is characterized by four unique trade 
facilitation measures, each of these measures bears a unique relationship to global best,   4
and each country has a unique trading pattern, the determination of which trade 
facilitation effort might yield the greatest increase in trade is unique to each country.   
 
Finally, the juxtaposition in multilateral forums of trade facilitation discussions 
and tariff negotiations points to the need to assess the relationship between these two 
approaches as they affect trade flows.  In this paper we offer some insights on these 
issues using a sample of 75 countries. 
 
2.  Overview of Previous Work 
 
2.1 Definition of Trade Facilitation  
There is no standard definition of trade facilitation in public policy discourse.  In 
a narrow sense, trade facilitation efforts simply address the logistics of moving goods 
through ports or more efficiently moving documentation associated with cross-border 
trade.  In recent years, the definition has been broadened to include the environment in 
which trade transactions take place, transparency and professionalism of customs and 
regulatory environments, as well as harmonization of standards and conformance to 
international or regional regulations.  These move the focus of trade facilitation efforts 
“inside the border” to domestic policies and institutional structures where capacity 
building can play an important role.  In addition, the rapid integration of networked 
information technology into trade means that modern definitions of trade facilitation need 
to encompass a technological concept as well.   
 
In light of this broadening definition of trade facilitation, our definition of trade 
facilitation incorporates relatively concrete “border” elements,  such as port efficiency 
and customs administration, and “inside the border” elements, such as domestic 
regulatory environment and the infrastructure to enable e-business usage.   
 
2.2 Measuring the Impact of Trade Facilitation 
The empirical literature on trade facilitation is limited; it is outlined in more detail 
in Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2003) (henceforth WMO).  Briefly, however, the tendency 
in work previous to WMO is first, to discuss what researchers would like to measure, but 
not to find measures or estimate their impact on trade (Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki 
(2001), Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (1999)).  Second, some use a single measure 
of trade facilitation to estimate effects of trade facilitation on trade.   
 
These latter estimates suggest large gains from trade facilitation efforts.  A 3 
percent reduction in landed costs applied to intra-APEC merchandise trade, as might be 
obtained by electronic documentation, reduces trade costs by US$60 billion.
1   A 1 
percent reduction in import prices for the industrial countries and the newly 
industrializing countries of Korea, Chinese Taipei and Singapore, and a 2 percent 
reduction for the other developing countries yields an increase in APEC merchandise 
trade of 3.3 percent—meaning the elasticity of trade facilitation efforts to trade flows is 
                                                 
1 See Paperless Trading:  Benefits to APEC (2001), page 18.   5
greater than 1.
2  Considering global estimates, a 1 percent reduction in the cost of 
maritime and air transport services in the developing countries could increase global GDP 
some US$7 billion (1997 dollars).   If trade facilitation is considered in a broader sense to 
include an improvement in wholesale and retail trade services, an additional US$7 billion 
could be gained by a 1 percent improvement in the productivity of that sector.
3  
 
Other authors consider more specific categories of trade facilitation effort or a 
more limited country set.  Hertel, Walmsley and Itakura (2001) find that greater standards 
harmonization for e-business and automating customs procedures between Japan and 
Singapore increase trade flows in overall between these countries as well as their trade 
flows with the rest of the world.  Hummels (2001) finds that each day saved in shipping 
time in part due to a faster customs clearance is worth 0.5 percentage point reduction of 
ad-valorem tariff. Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002a) examines the effect of 
anticompetitive practices in port services and other transport services on unit shipping 
cost.  Freund and Weinhold (2000) find that a 10 percent increase in the relative number 
of web hosts in one country would have increased trade flows by one percent in 1998 and 
1999.  Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002b) find that a 10 percent decrease in the bilateral 
price of phone calls is associated with an 8 percent increase in bilateral trade.  Moenius 
(2000) finds that bilaterally-shared and country-specific standards on goods trade 
promotes trade.  Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001a, 2001b) find that 10 percent tighter 
food standards in the European Union would reduce African exports of certain cereals, 
nuts, and dried foods by a range of 5 to 11 percent, depending on the category.  
 
WMO change these approaches to estimating the effect of trade facilitation on 
trade flows by constructing four measures of trade facilitation and estimating the 
independent effects of these four on the trade flows among a broad group of countries in 
the Asia Pacific region.  WMO use cross-country survey data on the business and policy 
climate in each APEC member to construct numerical measures of trade facilitation for 
each APEC member for port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment 
and , e-business usage (a proxy for service sector infrastructure important for trade).  
They find that the elasticity of increased port efficiency of importing countries is larger 
than the elasticity of improved customs environment or superior service sector 
infrastructure.  A unilaterally applied more stringent regulatory environment will reduce a 
country’s imports.  In simulations, they find that for the APEC economies as a group, 
improving port efficiency, customs environment and service sector infrastructure 
measures of the below-APEC-average economies half-way up to the APEC average for 
each trade facilitation measure yields an increase in trade of some 20 percent. Although 
on average the port efficiency indicator is the most important for trade facilitation, since 
each country has a unique set of indicators and pattern of trade, more detailed analysis of 
the simulation results shows that for some members of APEC, a trade facilitation measure 
other than ports may be the best to target for capacity building to improve that economy’s 
trade. 
 
                                                 
2 Assessing APEC Trade Liberalization and Facilitation:  1999 Update, Economic Committee, September 
1999, page11.  
3 See UNCTAD, E-Commerce and Development Report 2001, tables 8-11, page 33-36.    6
 
3. Data in This Study 
 
3.1  Rationale for These Indicators of Trade Facilitation  
The first essential task in the quantitative analysis of trade facilitation is to 
develop measures of trade facilitation.  WMO present four distinct areas of focus that 
meet policymakers’ needs for specificity on how to approach trade facilitation efforts.  
They are: (1) port efficiency, (2) customs environment, (3) own regulatory environment, 
and (4) service sector infrastructure. 
 
Port efficiency is designed to measure the quality of infrastructure of maritime 
and air ports.  Customs environment is designed to measure direct customs costs as well 
as administrative transparency of customs and border crossings.  Regulatory environment 
is designed to measure the economy’s approach to regulations.  Service sector 
infrastructure
4 is designed to measure the extent to which an economy has the necessary 
domestic infrastructure (such as telecommunications, financial intermediaries, and 
logistics firms) and is using networked information to improve efficiency and to 
transform activities to enhance economic activity.
5    
 
Besides the observation that these categories match areas for policy-maker 
attention, these trade facilitation measures also match several GATT articles and appear 
in the list of Singapore issues in the Doha Development Agenda, and therefore have 
salience for WTO negotiations.  The port efficiency measure has been constructed in 
accordance to GATT article V (freedom of transit).  This article says that freedom of 
movement is to be assured for goods, which should be allowed to move via the most 
convenient route, should be exempt from customs or transit duties, and should be free 
from unnecessary delays or restrictions.  Customs environment here consists of 
components that have their basis in the GATT article VIII.  GATT article VIII states that 
in order to minimize impediments to trade due to customs procedures, fees charged by 
customs officials must be limited to the approximate cost of customs services.  Also, 
there should not be substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations such 
as clerical errors.  Regulatory environment issues are contained in GATT article X which 
discusses Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations.  This article comes from 
the basic transparency obligation that requires prompt publication of laws and regulations 
affecting imports and exports so that foreign governments and traders may clearly 
understand them. 
 
3.2  Constructing the Measures Used in This Study  
 
This paper builds on the WMO methodology and categories of trade facilitation.  
However, because this paper broadens the set of countries for analysis to 75, the cross-
country survey data on business and policy climate that are used to construct the four 
indicators for each country are somewhat different from the data used to construct the 
                                                 
4 WMO used a different terminology- e-business usage- for this category. 
5 For further discussion of the relationship between domestic infrastructure and e-commerce, see Mann, 
Eckert, and Knight (2000).    7
indicators in WMO.  Specifically, we drop data sources that have limited country 
coverage (Clark, Dollar and Micco (2001) and Transparency International), but include 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) (henceforth KKZ) which has a wider 
country coverage.  Therefore, we rely on three sources--World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (henceforth GCR), IMD Lausanne, World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 (henceforth WCY), and KKZ.   See the Appendix for a 
more complete description of the sources and each of their methodologies for collecting 
and preparing data about a country.   
 
Because the survey scales of the sources differ, we must put all survey data from 
the three sources on comparable basis.  In contrast to WMO, we index each observation 
of a raw series (which is an observation representing a country) to the maximum of all the 
countries’ value for the raw series (e.g. global best practice).  WMO used the mean of all 
countries as a benchmark for each of the indexes.  We use the maximum as a benchmark 
since this easily indicates how far a country’s performance is from the best practice 
country whose indexed value is 1.0.  
 
Two survey data inputs are used to form each of the trade facilitation measures.  
We use multiple survey inputs into each trade facilitation indicator to avoid depending 
too heavily on any one survey question or source. 
         
The next step in creating the trade facilitation indictors involves collecting these 
indexed inputs into the four specific trade facilitation indicators.  A simple average of the 
two indexed inputs is used for transparency of method, and also because there is no 
specific argument (theoretical or statistical) to choose a different aggregation method.   
Therefore:    
 
  Port efficiency for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs from GCR:  
o  Port facilities and inland waterways  
o  Air transport    
 
  Customs environment for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs from 
GCR:  
o  Hidden import barriers   
o  Irregular extra payments and bribes 
  
  Regulatory environment for each country J is constructed as the average of indexed 
inputs from WCY and KKZ: 
o   Transparency of government policy is satisfactory (WCY) 
o  Control of Corruption (KKZ) 
 
  Service sector infrastructure for each country J is from GCR:  
o  Speed and cost of internet access  
o  Effect of internet on business  
   8
Within each of the trade facilitation categories, the correlation of the inputs that 
go into the final index are high, but less than one suggesting robustness of the 
methodology of using more than one survey indicator to construct the indicator.  As well, 
this raises confidence that the indicator is correctly assessing each country on that 
particular indicator of trade facilitation.  Correlation coefficients of the inputs to the 
indicators are 0.802, 0.820, 0.696, and 0.658 for categories of port efficiency, customs 
environment, regulatory environment and service sector infrastructure, respectively.    
 
Table 1 and Figures 1 to 4 (one for each trade facilitation indicator) report 
information about these indicators.  Table 1 shows, for each input as well as for the trade 
facilitation indicator, the mean, standard deviation, and minimum value along with 
countries of best and worst practice.  For best practice Singapore and Finland stand out.  
Worst practice is well distributed among many countries and regions of the world.  The 
figures show the indexed inputs for regional groups of countries for each specific trade 
facilitation indicator.
6  Each indexed input is represented by a horizontal bar.  The longer 
the bar extends to the right toward the maximum of 1.0, the higher ranked the region is in 
the category of trade facilitation.  A vertical line is drawn at the average value.  If a bar 
extends beyond the average for the particular trade facilitation measure, that indexed 
input for that region represents a condition superior to the average for all countries.  For 
example, Figure 1 shows that OECD, Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
7 and East 
Asia regions are above the global average in terms of the two indexed inputs for port 
efficiency.   
 
3.2 Trade Flows and Other Variables 
 
We use bilateral trade flow data available at the Commodity and Trade Database 
(COMTRADE) of the United Nations Statistics Division, for 2000 and 2001. We focus 
our attention on trade in manufactured goods, defined as commodities in categories 5 to 8 
in SITC 1 digit industry except those in category 68 (non-ferrous metals).  Our trade flow 
data aggregate the trade flows over the manufactured goods for a given importer-exporter 
pair.
8    
Tariff data were derived from the Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
We use the weighted average of applied tariff rates for the manufactured goods in 2000 
and 2001 under the above definition where bilateral trade values corresponding each 
tariff line are used as the weight.  The data on gross national p-roduct (GNP) and per 
capita GNP were derived for years 2000 and 2001 from the World Development 




                                                 
6 These regional indicators use a simple average of the region.  An average weighted by trade or GDP 
would no doubt yield somewhat different results. There is no clear interpretation of alternative weighted 
averages.  Moreover, these regional indexes are not used in estimation.   
7 Data are available only for Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.  
8 Standard International Trade Classification.  Revision 1 is used for our definition.   9
 
 
4.1 An Aside on the Gravity Model  
The gravity model of international trade flows, which we use, is a common 
approach to modeling bilateral trade flows.  It is enjoying a resurgence of interest given 
its natural kinship with current interests in the relationship between geography and trade.   
The standard gravity formulation includes various measures of market size (GDP, 
population, GDP per capita to account for intra-industry trade effects that may be 
associated with countries of similar incomes but varied tastes), measures of remoteness 
(distance and adjacency), and measures of kinship (regional trade arrangements, and 
language/ethnic similarities).  To this basic formulation, we will add tariffs as well as the 
trade facilitation indicators and some additional factors, as described further below.     
 
Despite the empirical success of gravity models to mimic trade patterns, there are 
serious questions as to the theoretical validity of the gravity model formulation.  Some 
studies attempt to add additional structural elements to the gravity model to better reflect 
real world observations.  These mainly concern the heterogeneity of traded goods in 
quality and price by origin, and price differentials associated with border and 
transportation costs.  Anderson (1979) develops a gravity model in line with a general 
equilibrium framework.  He incorporates into a gravity model consumers’ preferences 
over goods that are differentiated by region of origin, assuming the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) structure on consumers’ preferences.  Anderson and von Wincoop 
(2003) additionally introduce the border costs as premiums on the export prices.  
Balistreri and Hillberry (2001) extend the results of the Anderson and von Wincoop’s 
gravity model to estimate the transport and border costs separately by distinguishing 
consumers’ and producers’ price indices.   
 
4.2  Our Gravity Model Specification  
 
Using a standard gravity model as reviewed above, the basic structure of our 
specific gravity equation is the following: 
 
ln(VJI
t ) = b1ln(100+TARIFFJI
t) + b2 lnPEJ + b3lnREJ + b4lnSIJ + b5lnPEI + b6lnCEI + 





b13ln(DISTIJ)+b14DADJ  +b15 D ASEAN +  b 16DNAFTA +  b17 D LAIA  +  b18 D AUNZ + b19 
DMERCOSUR + b20DEU + b21DENG + b22DFRC + b23DSPN + b24 DARB + b25 DCHN + b26 DGMN 
+ b27 DPOR + b28 DRUS + b29 D2000 +
t
JI ε     (1) 
 
4. The Econometric Model and Results   10
where I and J stand for the importer and exporter respectively, and t denotes trading years 
(t=2000, 2001).  Parameter b’s are coefficients.  The term
t
JI ε is the error term, assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean zero.  The value of manufactures exports from 
country J to I is denoted as VJI (so exporter to importer).  The term TARIFFJI denotes 
applied tariff rate in the percent ad valorem term that is specific to the trading partners I 
and J and year t.  The inclusion of the tariff variable is useful for reducing omitted 
variable biases.  It is particularly important for some nations since unlike the EU whose 
tariff policies are harmonized, applied tariff rates generally vary across most other 
countries and possibly across their exporting partners.   
 
The terms PEJ, REJ and SIJ denote exporting country J’s indicators of port 
efficiency, regulatory environment, and service sector infrastructure.  Similarly, PEI, REI 
and SII stand for the same trade facilitation measures in the importing country.  For the 
importing country we include one additional measure i.e. “customs environment” or  CEI.   
We use “customs environment” only for the importers since in bilateral trade customs is 
more relevant as a factor affecting imports than exports.  
 
This set of trade facilitation variables is different than in WMO.  There, we 
included only PEI, REI,  SII , and CEI .  That is, for country I we considered only the effect 
on imports of unilateral trade facilitation. Country  I’s exports improved indirectly when 
its trading partners improved their trade facilitation efforts.  In this formulation, we take 
explicit account of the fact that country J’ s exports (as well as its imports) will improve 
through its own trade facilitation efforts.    
 
The term GNP denotes gross national product and GNPPC denotes per capita 
GNP, where both are expressed in 1995 US dollar terms.  Geographical distance between 
capital cities I and J is denoted as DISTIJ.  Dummy variables are included to capture the 
effect of preferential trade arrangements, language similarity and adjacency.  The trade 
arrangements dummies include NAFTA (DNAFTA), ASEAN (DASEAN), LAIA (DLAIA), 
AUNZ  (DAUNZ), MERCOSUR(DMERCOSUR) and EU (DEU).  The language dummies 
include English (DENG), French(DFRC), Spanish(DSPN), Arabic(DARB), Chinese (DCHN), 
German(DGMN), Portuguese (DPOR) and Russian (DRUS).  The adjacency dummy DADJ 
takes the value of one if country I is adjacent to country J and zero otherwise.  
Additionally a dummy for year 2000 is included in the model to control for time-specific 
shocks. 
 
Table 2 shows the simple correlations among the included variables.  All four 
trade facilitation variables are rather highly correlated with each other and rather highly 
correlated with per capita income of the importer.  This is to be expected, first because 
the trade facilitation indicators are different facets of overall trade facilitation, and second 
because some of the elements of trade facilitation (administrative transparency, available 
resources to build quality ports, and so on) are more prevalent in higher income 
economies.   
 
These relatively high correlations between trade facilitation and income and the 
use of a single-year observation for the construction of the trade-facilitation indicators in   11
cross-section regression analysis points to the potentially ambiguous causal relationship 
between trade facilitation and trade.  We cannot exclude the possibility that greater 
bilateral trade will lead to higher values of trade facilitation measures rather than the 
postulated reverse relationship as estimated.  Port efficiency, customs environment and 
service sector infrastructure may induce reforms that improve with a country’s import 
and export flows and the estimated coefficients for these variables would be biased 
upwards if this endogeneity is present.  
 
 A logical approach to the endogeneity problem is (1) to employ instrumental 
variables for the trade facilitation variables so the error term does not correlate with trade 
facilitation measures, and/or (2) to extend the trade facilitation data to a multiple year 
series and to use time-lagged measures of trade facilitation as explanatory variables.  
Good instruments should be sufficiently exogenous to decision makers or pre-determined, 
and should uniquely capture the characteristics of each trade facilitation indicator. Given 
the very large number of countries, finding good instruments is difficult, and data are 
lacking.  We have already used such data exhaustively as inputs to form our trade 
facilitation indicators.  The implication of the use of time-lagged measures was 
investigated in more depth in WMO using the smaller and more data rich APEC sample, 
yielding weak evidence that endogeneity was not too large an issue.   
 
Further methodological issue arise from not having time-varying  trade facilitation 
indicators.  We cannot use a fixed effects model to isolate country specific effects that are 
correlated but not specific to trade facilitation.  Whereas WMO used a fixed-effects 
model to account for the variation across exporting countries, here the use of country’s 
trade facilitation measures as an exporter will make it impossible to use fixed-effects for 
exporting countries.  The time-varying gravity variables and the dummy variables will 
absorb variation other than that caused by differences in trade facilitation such that the 
trade facilitation variables appropriately capture the country specific effect associated 
only with trade facilitation.  Although, we re-open the endogeneity box with this rationale.  
 
In the end, our estimation can only be improved when panel data with a 
sufficiently long time series in trade facilitation variables become available, which would 
allow direct attention to endogeneity and application of fixed-effect modeling.   
 
4.3 Regression Results 
 
The approach used here, which constructs  a set of distinct trade facilitation 
indicators and deploys them in a gravity model of trade, is generally successful. Table 3 
displays regression results.  The first column includes the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for the model under the specification in Equation (1). The second column 
includes those for the specification with aggregate FTA and language dummies (i.e. 
membership of any FTA, or any common language).  The model was run using an 
ordinary least squares (OLS).  The coefficients for the four trade facilitation measures are 
statistically significant and the estimated coefficients differ for the different trade 
facilitation indicators.  From a policy perspective, these differences in estimated 
elasticities of trade flows with respect to trade facilitation indicator implies that different   12
approaches to trade facilitation will differentially affect trade of individual countries and 
of all countries in the sample as a whole.  The estimates are robust to the choice of 
dummy for language and regional arrangement.     
 
Before considering the trade facilitation indicators, it is worthwhile to consider 
tariffs.  Higher tariffs have a significant and the expected negative effect (with –1.2 
coefficient) on trade.  The coefficient on tariffs is similar to that of distance.  In ad 
valorem terms, the elasticity of tariff is –1.1 at the global average level of tariff rates - i.e. 
1% reduction in ad valorem tariff from the global average (from 8.5% to 7.5%) will 
increase the trade flow by 1.1% and a 1% reduction in distance (80 kilometers from the 
global average) would yield a 1.3% increase in trade flow.  These figures are useful 
benchmarks against which to compare the coefficients on the trade facilitation indicators.     
 
Port efficiency of both the importer and the exporter is positively associated with 
trade; that is, an improvement in the indicator toward best practice is associated with an 
increase in trade flows.  Comparing the effect of port efficiency on imports vs. exports, 
we note that the coefficient is higher for exporters than importer, which implies that 
global trade flows get a bigger boost when the exporters’ port efficiency improves.    So 
for countries and regions that are well below the global best practice, such as Bolivia and 
Slovak Republic (from Table 1) there is great potential for improvement in terms of port 
efficiency.  Moreover, the range of performance on this measure of trade facilitation is 
the largest among the trade facilitation indicators (again see Table 1).  So, the 
opportunities for increased trade from improvements in this measure of trade facilitation 
could be quite large.   
 
Customs environment also has a significantly positive effect on trade of the 
importing country with an elasticity of 0.47, which is smaller than that for tariffs.  
Although the two metrics are different (ad valorem for tariffs and survey indicator for 
customs), the sign and size of elasticity present support for the attention to this as a 
Singapore issue.  Trade facilitation is a possible avenue for reducing the cost of imports 
through customs improvements even as tariffs remain where they are.   
 
Improving the regulatory environment of the importer and exporter has a positive 
and significant association with trade with coefficients of 0.28 and 0.62, respectively.  As 
with ports, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the exporter than for the 
importer.  The sign of the coefficient for regulatory environment of importer is reversed 
from that in WMO.  In contrast that paper, the survey inputs used to construct regulatory 
environment indicator in this analysis are more unambiguously trade-promoting.  
Regulatory transparency and control of corruption (the two inputs) reduce unnecessary 
information costs of trading and reduce barriers to private business.  
 
Improving indicators of service sector infrastructure are positive and significantly 
associated with trade among the studied countries.  Similar to port efficiency and 
regulatory environment, service sector infrastructure have a more significant positive 
effect on the exporters than for importers.  The elasticity of the exporters’ service sector 
infrastructure is the highest among all trade facilitation measures (1.94).  This high   13
elasticity should come as no surprise since the role of the services-sectors in trade 
facilitation is important.
9   
 
It is notable that for all the trade facilitation indicators that are paired (that is, are 
estimated for both exporters and importers), the coefficient for exporters exceeds that for 
importers.  There are several reasons why this might be the case.  First, in the sample of 
countries, there are 30 developed countries (North) and 45 developing countries (South). 
Thus, the sample is weighted toward developing countries where the elasticity of 
improvement in trade facilitation indicators is likely to be higher than for the developed 
countries whose trade facilitation indicators are already high.  Second, the pattern of trade 
in general is South-North (even if the value of trade North-North is larger).  So, the 
estimated coefficients would tend to pick up the higher elasticity of trade from the South 
to the North.   
 
To further investigate this issue, as well as to shed light on the potential for 
capacity building in the area of trade facilitation in the south, we examined the gravity 
model using several sub-sets of the 75 countries bilateral trade.  Specifically, we re-
estimated the gravity model on south-to-north trade and on south-to-south trade.  Table 4 
presents the results for the trade facilitation indicators for two sub-panels.  Also repeated 
in the table for convenience are the values of the coefficients from the full panel. 
 
Comparing across the three panels, several points emerge.  In the South-to-North 
panel, many of the variables added to the gravity model for the North (as importer) are 
not significant -- tariffs, port efficiency, the customs environment, and (nearly) the 
regulatory environment. The lack of significance on tariffs suggests that tariffs are not a 
major impediment to South-to-North trade.  The fact that the trade facilitation indicators 
are nearer to global best in the North means that the other variables in the gravity model 
(such as GDP) dominate in estimation.  On the other hand, the service sector 
infrastructure indicator has a higher coefficient than in the full sample for both importer 
and exporter, corroborating work cited earlier on the benefits of more Webhosts and 
lower telecommunications costs for trade.  The high coefficient on regulatory 
environment in the exporting country  (South) would support a focus on capacity building 
in this area in the South.     
 
Second, compare the South-to-South panel with the other two samples.  Tariffs 
are once again significant, suggesting that south-to-south trade is more affected by tariffs 
than is south-to-north trade.  Regulatory environment appears to be very important for 
both directions of trade.  Looking at all the indicators, the coefficient estimated on the 
exporter is larger than the full sample and larger than for the importer in the restricted 
sample, suggesting that trade facilitation efforts and capacity building could play a 
complementary role in export promotion in the south.  
                                                 
9 Other research investigates the relative magnitude of service sector liberalization compared to 
manufactures and agricultural liberalization in the context of the Uruguay round and the Doha Agenda.  
Several researchers conclude that liberalization of services trade would yield at least as large an increase in 
GDP than does liberalization of manufactures trade, and much larger than liberalization of agriculture 
trade.   See the discussion and sources in Mann, Rosen and APEC (2001, 2002), pages 33-35.   14
 
Finally, given the juxtaposition in the Doha Agenda of tariff negotiations and 
Singapore trade facilitation issues, it is interesting to apply the regression results to the 
question of tariffs vs. trade facilitation.  The data used in the estimation indicates an 
average 8.5 percent tariff rate.  Figure 5 suggests that a complete tariff elimination would 
be associated with an increase in trade flow equivalent to a 15.6% (or 5.2%) 
improvement in port efficiency by importer (or exporter) or a 10.2% improvement in 
customs environment by the importer or an increase in indicator of service sector 
infrastructure by 6.6% (importer) or 2.5%(exporter).  In terms of regulatory environment 
the same trade gains from a complete tariff cut is equivalent to 17.0 % (7.8%) 
improvement of regulatory environment by importer (exporter).  
 
4.4 Implications of Geographical Characteristics 
Geographical characteristics such as being landlocked or an island can affect trade.  
Frankel and Rose (2000) included dummy variables for those geographical characteristics 
to allow for the intercept term to vary accordingly.  We additionally allow for the 
coefficient for trade facilitation indicators to vary according to those characteristics.  Our 
particular interest is whether ports play more important role in the import and export of 
landlocked countries, or whether ports play a less important role for island countries.  
Ports may play a less important role in trade between countries that share land borders.  
We perform this analysis by additionally introducing cross-product terms between the 
port efficiency indicators and these geographical characteristics based on the main 
regression model. 
 
Landlocked, island, and adjacency variables are used here to differentiate the 
effect of port efficiency.  Table 5 indicates the results for varied specifications.  In the 
first three columns one characteristic is considered at a time.  In the fourth column 
landlockedness and island are jointly considered as these characteristics are mutually 
exclusive.  The last column allow for the coefficients for port efficiency to vary with 
respect to all the three characteristics.  Consider first geographical adjacency.  As 
expected, for countries that share land borders, ports are less important than for countries 
that do not.  Interpreting the estimates for landlocked and island is more difficult.  For 
landlocked countries, the importance of ports are as important for both import and export 
as in non-landlocked countries since the product terms are insignificant.  Landlocked 
countries are disadvantaged in maritime transport but may have developed ground and air 
transport infrastructure and our port efficiency indicator is a combination of both types of 
ports.  For island countries, it appears that  ports are more important for their import and 
less important for their export compared to non-island countries.  This result is difficult to 
interpret, but is consistent with some research that finds that small island economies are 
disadvantaged in export trade because they cannot offer a scale of production sufficiently 
large to compete in international markets or be part of an international value chain in 
production (Winters, 2004). 
 
4.5 Robustness of the OLS Estimators 
OLS estimation imposes the assumption that the error term is identically 
distributed.  This assumption often is inappropriate for grouped data where the error term   15
is heterosckedastic.  Robustness of the OLS estimated standard error of the coefficients is 
examined by using heterosckedasticity-robust variance.  The second column of Table 6 
reports the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance which is used without specifying 
a cluster (group) of the sample (see White (1980) for the procedure).  In the third and 
fourth column a cluster is formed with respect to importer and exporter, respectively. As 
an alternative approach, we performed weighted least squares (WLS) by correcting the 
error term for heterosckedasticity by using the estimated variance for importer (the fifth 
column) or exporter (the sixth column). These results are compared with the main result 
displayed in the first column.  Standard error are acceptably robust across those 
specifications.  The significance of the key variables generally remain.  The WLS 
coefficients are also similar to the OLS ones while a few coefficients turn insignificant.   
 
 
5.  Potential Benefits from Trade Facilitation: Simulation Results 
 
5.1 Simulation Design and Aggregate Results   
 
The gravity model approach allows us to consider how much trade among the 75 
countries might be increased under various scenarios of improved trade facilitation and/or 
tariff reduction.  We will examine scenarios that focus on improved port efficiency, 
improved customs environment, improved service sector infrastructure, and regulatory 
environment.  Our objective in the simulations is to help inform policymakers on which 
specific trade facilitation initiatives might have the greatest potential to increase trade and 
economic well-being.   
 
We follow the simulation strategy presented in WMO, which uses a formula to 
design a unique program of reform for each country in the sample.  The formula brings 
the below-average countries in the group half-way to the average for the entire set of 
countries.  We focus on the below-average country on the grounds that donor attention 
and capacity building efforts should be extended to this group.  It is not that the country 
with the best practice should not try to do better; it is just that limited multilateral 
resources are not best utilized that way.   
 
We choose an improvement of half-way to the average because there are limited 
development resources and improvements take time.  Dramatic improvements are 
possible, but it is not realistic to presume a scenario whereby all countries in the sample 
are assumed to achieve best practice as measured by the nation with the highest score on 
a particular measure of trade facilitation.
10  Since each economy has a specific value for 
each trade facilitation indicator, each country that is below-average on that indicator will 
improve by a different amount so as to get half-way to average.  Our simulation approach 
acknowledges the differential potential for improvement revealed by Table 1.  This 
approach contrasts with the here-to-fore standard approach to simulation design where all 
                                                 
10 Moreover, it is the case that in the course of the simulation, the ‘average’ target will rise, and we do not 
take account of this endogeneity.  By restricting the improvement to half-way to average, we limit to some 
degree these second round effects.    16
countries improve trade facilitation measures by a given percentage, such as when trade 
costs are ‘shocked’ by, say, 1 percent in a CGE model.   
 
Therefore, the countries for which we will simulate an improvement in trade 
facilitation will differ by the trade facilitation indicator.  However, because trade 
facilitation links exporters and importers, all economies enjoy an increase in trade among 
each other even when only some have an improvement in their trade facilitation indicator.  
Having the coefficients for both importer’s and exporter’s trade facilitation measures 
enables us to simulate the change in trade flow from different perspectives:  the country 
itself and the group as a whole.  Figure 6 shows the various pieces of the simulation.   
 
From the standpoint of a specific country, improvement, say, in port efficiency 
should increase both its own imports and exports. The same can be expected for 
regulatory environment, and service sector infrastructure, as well as customs on the 
import side.  But, a country will export more not only from its own reforms, but also 
because of reforms undertaken by its trading partners as importers.  Thus export gains are 
the sum of the simulated effect on exports of unilateral reform and of import reforms 
undertaken by the country’s trading partners.  On the import side, a country’s imports 
increase first on account of its unilateral import reforms, and secondarily on account of 
the reforms undertaken by its trading partners as exporters.  Examining the relative gains 
to trade from unilateral reforms as compared to partner’s reforms, and on exports vs. 
imports, and across trade facilitation indicators offers three dimensions of potential 
insight to policymakers, donors, and the private sector.   
 
Table 7 summarizes the results for the simulations and presents the results for the 
75 countries as a whole.  In total, the collection of simulations on the four trade 
facilitation indicators yields an increase in trade among the 75 countries worth about 
$377 billion, representing an increase of about 9.7 percent in total trade among these 
countries.  About $107 billion of the total gain comes from the improvement in port 
efficiency and about $33 billion emanates from the improvement in customs 
environment.  The gain from the improvement in regulatory environment is $83 billion. 
The largest gain comes from the improvement in service sector infrastructure ($154 
billion), which is consistent with the broad concept of services infrastructure that this 
variable is designed to capture.  
 
Table 8 summarizes the change in trade flow by region, by trade facilitation 
indicators, and by own vs. trading partners’ reforms.  All this detail can be combined in 
several ways to give different perspectives on which regions gain the most and why.  One 
cut, exports and imports by region and by trade facilitation indicator, is shown in Figures 
7 and 8.  Figure 9 show increases in exports from domestic and partner reforms by region 
and by trade facilitation indicator.         
 
5.2  Exports and Imports by Region  
 
The first perspective on the detail is which region gains the most from what kinds 
of trade facilitation improvement and as an exporter or importer, and whether through   17
own or trading partner reforms  (as defined in Figure 6).  To summarize:  In all of these 
scenarios, the gains from own reforms are much larger, whether as importer or exporter, 
and the gains as an exporter from own reforms are dramatic.  With respect to regions, the 
largest gainers (in percentage terms) are generally South Asia and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, with Latin American and Caribbean not far behind in terms of potential 
increases.  In contrast, and on account of their relatively lower integration in global trade, 
Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa do not see much of improvement 
in their trade experience, either as exporters or importers.  The results for Middle East 
and North Africa and for Sub-Saharan Africa must be viewed with caution as the number 
of countries with data from these two regions is quite limited.
11   
 
Considering port efficiency, South Asia gains the most as an exporter (12.1 % 
increase in trade) followed by East Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (9.5%). The bulk of 
South Asia gains come from increased exports due to its own improvements (11.5%) as 
opposed to only 0.4% export gain due to its importing partners’ improvement in port 
efficiency.  South Asia’s percentage gain is the highest because the region’s average port 
efficiency is the lowest of all the regions.  The “half-way to the average” scenario will 
consequently lead to a significant improvement in port efficiency in South Asia, which 
will have a large export promotion effect in the region.  An examination of the detail 
from the simulation finds that in the South Asia region, Bangladesh accrues the highest 
percentage gain (32.5 %) whereas India has the maximum gain in dollar amount ($2.3 
billion).  A similar pattern occurs in ECA region, with the export gains from its own 
improvements at 8.7% versus only 0.8% increase in exports due to improvement in ports 
by its importing partners.  In the ECA region the highest export gain is attained by 
Hungary in the amount of $3.0 billion  (13.4 % change) and Slovak Republic gains the 
most in terms of percentage (28.8 % or $2.4 billion gain).   
 
Examining the importer’s side (as defined in Figure 6), regional variation in trade 
gains in percentage is much smaller for imports than exports.  Four out of the seven 
regions will have an increase of more than 4 percent.  The ECA obtains the highest 
import gain (4.9 %) followed by South Asia (4.5 %).  ECA has an increase in imports of 
3.1% from improving its own ports, and an additional 1.8% increase in imports from its 
exporting partners’ improvement in their port efficiency. For South Asia these 
percentages are slightly lower: the gains from the partners improvement (1.4 %) is less 
than from own improvement (3.1 %).  As an example of the country detail from these 
simulations, in ECA the largest increase in imports from own and partners’ reforms turns 
out to be Hungary and Slovak Republic.  Hungary in terms of dollar amount ($1.5 
billion) and Slovak Republic in terms of percentage (12.3 %).  In South Asia, India 
obtains the largest import gain in dollar amount ($0.79 billion) and Sri Lanka attains the 
maximum percentage gain (5.7 %).  Thus, improvement in port efficiency is found to 
provide a country a dual benefit by promoting both imports and exports.   
 
                                                 
11 The countries from MENA are Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.  For SSA, data are available only for Mauritius, 
Nigeria, and South Africa.   
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Considering the customs environment, all the regions increase exports from the 
improvements in customs of the trading partners.  This indicator is a good place to show 
the value of examining the simulation results from the standpoint of exporters or 
importers and at both regional and country detail.  In principle, as exporters, countries 
gain when their partner’s engage in reforms.  But, the simulations suggest that the 
increase in trade coming from the improvement in the country’s own customs 
environment exceeds the increase in trade when the improvement in customs is by the 
exporters.  At least this is true when looking at the regions.  Careful analysis of the 
country detail (where the individual nature of a country’s trading pattern is crucial for the 
simulations) could find a more nuanced result.      
 
For example, as exporters, somewhat larger gains are enjoyed by Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), where both 
regions increase exports by 0.9%.  In terms of country detail, in the ECA region Russia 
gains the most with an amount of $0.37 billion (2.2%) whereas Ukraine would have the 
highest percentage gain (4.5%).  In the LAC region Brazil has the highest amount of 
export gain with $0.53 billion export gain whereas Panama would enjoy the highest 
export gain in term of percentage increase (5.1%).   
 
As importers, the increase in trade from own reforms as importers is more than 
double that for partner’s reforms. South Asia accrues the highest percentage gain (5.8%).  
India gains in the amount of $0.98 billion (5.4%) and Sri Lanka gains by 16.9 % with the 
amount of $0.25 billion.  In South Asia only India and Sri Lanka turn out to be gainers 
while no data are available for Bangladesh.  
 
Considering service sector infrastructure, the regional pattern is similar to that of 
ports, as is the source of the distribution of the gains.  From the standpoint as exporter, 
South Asia gains the most (20.0%),  with the largest export gain by percentage accrued 
by Bangladesh (30.6%) and India gets the maximum gain in dollar amount ($5.4 billion 
of exports.  East Europe and Central Asia obtains 13.5% export gain from improvement 
in service sector infrastructure half-way up to the average. In the ECA region the largest 
export gain goes to Russia ($6.3 billion or 37%) from the improvement of service sector 
infrastructure.  As in the case of ports, the lion’s share of the gain comes from country’s 
own improvements, rather than improvements by their trading partners.  South Asia gains 
0.7% from the improvement of service sector infrastructure by its trading partners 
whereas from its own improvement of service sector infrastructure the export gain for 
South Asia is 19.2%.   
 
If we look at the importers’ experience, we find the same picture. South Asia 
gaining the most as importers (9.3%) followed by East Europe and Central Asia (ECA) 
(7.7%).  Again in both regions gains are realized from improvement in service sector 
infrastructure in trading partners but relatively more imports arrive as a consequence of 
own improvements.  In South Asia, India gains the most as importer ($1.7 billion or 
9.6%).  In the ECA region, Russia has the highest import gain ($3.2 billion or 16.9%).  
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Finally, considering the regulatory environment there is some change in the 
regional pattern, but not in the source of the gains.  Examining first the perspective as 
exporters, an improved regulatory environment leads to a 7.4% and 6.1% export gains for 
South Asia and LAC, respectively, India contributes the most to the South Asia’s gains 
($2.4 billion) and Mexico contributes most to LAC’s gains ($2.9 billion).  Just as for the 
other trade facilitation measures, however, the source of the exports gain is 
predominantly on account of improvements in the exporter’s own regulatory environment, 
rather than a change in the environment of its trading partners.   
 
In the experience of importers, South Asia is the largest gainer in percentage 
(4.8%), followed by the ECA region (4.0%).  In South Asia, India is the largest gainer in 
the amount and percentage ($0.93 billion (5.2%)).  In the ECA region, Turkey is the 
largest gainer in the amount- $1.7 billion (6%), while Russia gains the largest in the 
percentage (6.5%).  As before, the source of the gains comes from own reforms, although 
the differences are less dramatic.  For example, in the case of South Asia, 3.3 % of the 
gain comes from own reforms and 1.5% from reforms by trading partners.   
 
The simulation result of the regulatory environment scenario is particularly 
sensitive due to the large positive coefficient of trade flow with respect to exporter’s 
regulatory environment.  The simulation result therefore should be viewed with care.   
 
In overall, from improvement in all trade facilitation measures the highest export 
gain is attained by South Asia (40.3%) followed by the ECA region (30.0%).  High gains 
for South Asia emanates from high export gains due to improvement in port efficiency, 
and service sector infrastructure.  Likewise, the ECA region gains in its exports mainly 
from reforms in port efficiency and service sector infrastructure.  In both cases, the gains 
come principally on account of their own improvements, rather than the improvements by 
trading partners.  In the South Asia region, India has the highest dollar amount gain 
($10.4 billion) and Bangladesh obtains the maximum percentage gain (68.3%). In the 
LAC region, Mexico accrues an export gain in the amount of $17.3 billion i.e. the highest 
in the region and Paraguay realizes a gain of 74.8%.  Mexico and Paraguay’s high gains 
again come from the improvement in ports and service sector infrastructure.  
 
Looking globally, the highest export gain among all the countries due to the 
combined improvement of all trade facilitation measures is attained by China and it is in 
the amount of $120.7 billion.  However, the East Asia region (which includes China) 
does not stand out in terms of export gains since the other countries in that region do not 
enjoy large export gains because many of the East Asian countries rank rather highly in 
terms of the trade facilitation indicators already and therefore are not “reforming” very 
much in these simulations.     
 
In the global picture as importers, South Asia is the biggest gainer (24.4%) 
followed by the ECA region (19.8%).  In South Asia region, India gains the most, 
accruing $4.4 billion or 24.5%.  India gains in large amount as importer due the 
improvement in all the trade facilitation measures.  In the ECA region, the big winner is 
Russia gaining a high amount from improvement in service sector infrastructure.   20
 
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention the results for the OECD countries, since they 
further emphasize the importance of the reforms by the developing countries.  The 
simulations show that the OECD countries increase their imports when the developing 
countries improve their trade facilitation measures. Whereas the percentage increase in 
OECD trade as an importer (at 6.9%) is not particularly dramatic among regional groups, 
because the level of OECD trade is much larger than any other regional group’s trade (at 
$2761 billion it represents about three-quarter of the trade in the sample) the dollar value 
of gains is huge.  It is worthwhile for developing countries to invest in their own trade 
facilitation because the increase in developing country exports will occur through the 
increased ability to export to the OECD market.  The export gains will particularly accrue 
to the countries which have a drastic reform and those which are net exporters of 
manufacturing goods. 
 
Does this observation regarding the magnitude of the OECD market mean that 
South-to-South trade facilitation efforts or regional integration efforts should be 
abandoned?  No.  The South-to-South sample discussed earlier shows the importance of 
improvements in trade facilitation efforts in the south, and suggests that the elasticity of 
trade facilitation efforts South-to-South could be quite large.  
 
5.3 Domestic and Partner Improvements  
 
The relative importance of own reforms is further confirmed by Figure 9.  The 
figure illustrates the simulated change in the sum of imports and exports by region from 
domestic reforms (left panel) and partners’ reform (right panel) in trade facilitation.  
Comparing across trade facilitation areas, the relative importance of domestic trade 
facilitation measures differs significantly.  The largest increase in trade come from 
service sector infrastructure and port efficiency.  However, these domestic reforms are 
consistent with the benefits to come from partner’s reforms.  So, the priority areas for 
domestic reform within an individual region are the same as those in the scenario of 
global or collective movement to raise capacity.  This has relevance from the standpoint 
of consistency between objectives of the Doha Agenda and other regional or bilateral 
negotiations.  Finally, this figure also indicates that the gains to developing countries will 
be much greater than those to the (high-income) OECD countries, because the developed 
countries in the OECD region are collectively much closer to best practice across all the 
indicators examined. 
 
Importantly from the standpoint of balance of payments concerns, for most 
developing countries domestic reforms will yield more exports than imports  -- with a 
significant part of the gains resulting from the increased access to OECD markets.  This 
focus on domestic reforms is somewhat different from the ‘request-offer’ procedure 
common in trade negotiations.  As the exceptions, Africa and Middle East regions will 
have relatively small export gains compared to import gains - implying that they do not 
benefit from the increased access to OECD markets as much.  The results suggest that 
trade facilitation reform should be implemented with particular care in these regions   21
when the countries’ major objective of the reform is export promotion and there are 
balance-of-payments concerns.   
 
Finally, in considering the specific nature of capacity building, it is critical go to 
the country detail.  The panels of Figure 10 show, for example, that Guatemala has a 
great potential for trade gains from its domestic reform in service sector infrastructure.  In 
contrast, for Indonesia, the gains from regulatory reform dominate those associated with 
the enhancement of service sector infrastructure.  Finally, in Nigeria, the reform in its 
customs system could have the most valuable outcome.  Across all the countries 
considered, domestic reform will have much larger impact on total trade (imports plus 
exports).   
 
 
6. Conclusions and Approach to Capacity Building Design 
 
The analysis in this paper builds on the method developed in Wilson, Mann and 
Otsuki (2003).  Four indicators of trade facilitation are developed: port efficiency, 
customs environment, regulatory environment, and e-commerce use by business (as a 
proxy for service sector infrastructure).  These indicators are implemented in a gravity 
model of trade.  Simulations are designed that take account of the differential character of 
trade facilitation in each country as measured by each of the four categories.  Using this 
set of indicators, modeling approach, and simulation design offers policymakers more 
information about what type of trade facilitation efforts might provide the largest gains in 
terms of increasing trade flow.   
 
The improvements to this paper include broadening the country set to 75 
countries.  In addition, a better measure of regulatory environment was constructed that is 
less ambiguous in interpretation of its impact on trade.   
 
A particularly crucial improvement in this paper is to consider the effect on 
bilateral trade flow of trade facilitation reform both from the standpoint of the reforming 
country’s exports and its imports.  In the earlier paper, a country gained in exports on 
account of the improvements to its trading partner’s trade facilitation efforts. In this new 
specification, a country can increase its exports unilaterally through trade facilitation 
efforts.  This will provide information that is useful if a country looks to trade facilitation 
reforms as a strategy of export promotion.   
 
The total gain in trade flow in manufacturing goods from trade facilitation 
improvements in all four areas is estimated to be $377 billion; all regions gain in imports 
and exports.  Most regions gain more in terms of exports than imports in large part 
through increasing exports to the OECD market.  The most important ingredient in 
getting these gains, particularly to the OECD market, is the country’s own trade 
facilitation efforts.  In terms of regional analysis, South Asia has the greatest potential for 
both export and import growth, with export gains greater than import gains.  In contrast 
countries in Africa and the Middle East have relatively small export gains compared to 
import gains because they are less integrated into the global trade in manufactures, and   22
have less overall access to the OECD market.  (The number of countries from these 
regions in the sample is small, so the results for these regions must be viewed with 
caution.)  
   
The results also shed light on the GATT articles, Doha Development Agenda, and 
on the Singapore issues.  Compliance with GATT Article V (freedom of transit) as 
proxied by the port efficiency indicator, and with Article VIII (fees and formalities 
connected with importation and exportation), as proxied by the customs environment 
indicator, would yield a $107 billion and $33 billion increase in manufacturing trade, 
respectively.  Compliance with GATT X (publication and administration of trade 
regulations), as proxied by the regulatory environment indicator would yield an $83 
billion increase in trade flow. Finally, with respect to services negotiations, 
improvements in service sector infrastructure could yield $154 billion increase in trade.   
These results should shed light on discussions at the WTO.  
 
Finally, country-specific detail from these simulations, in conjunction with case 
studies and country-specific knowledge, could help inform and design capacity building 
to support trade.  For example, Lane (2001) suggests that the Latin America region has 
been lagging behind in terms of customs environment.  Our results confirm that LAC 
could gain from attention to customs.  A case study from Peru showed that manual and 
paperwork-intensive systems resulted in a long clearance time for customs and limited 
transparency.  But Peruvian customs reforms achieved remarkable gains in compliance, 
cost, and trade facilitation.  So case study plus simulation detail, plus country-specific 
analysis could help other countries follow Peru’s lead in reforms.  Similarly, the analysis 
in this paper indicates that South Asia has a large scope for trade promotion from trade 
facilitation reform.  In Bangladesh, a customs modernization program is helping to 
eradicate the corruption and inefficiency in fee collection.  Rapid clearance for exports 
and their imported inputs, increased automation, efficient risk management systems and 
staff training are working to achieve this goal (World Bank 1999).  Our results point not 
just to a need to focus on customs, but more broadly to address ports, regulatory 
environment, and particularly the domestic services infrastructure that support economic 
activity and trade.  Further compilation of case studies in these areas would assist in 
capacity building efforts.     
 
In conclusion, the results from this paper suggest that the scope and benefit of 
unilateral trade facilitation reforms are very large and that the gains fall 
disproportionately on exports.  Combining the country detail from these simulations with 
case study analysis of specific reform efforts and the specifics of a country’s trade 
facilitation challenges can triangulate on a design strategy for capacity building to 
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Data Appendix 
 
Data come from the World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-02 
(GCR), IMD Lausanne, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002 (WCY), and Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) (KKZ).  All survey data in GCR comes from the World 
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey.  A total of 4022 firms were surveyed.  “In 
order to provide the basis for a comparative assessment on a global basis, it is essential 
that we interview a sufficient number of senior business leaders in individual countries 
and that the sample in each country is not biased in favor of any particular business 
group.  We have taken a number of steps to ensure this.  First, we have asked each of our 
partner institutes, the organizations that administer the surveys in each country, to start 
with a comprehensive register of firms.  From this, they were asked to choose a sample 
whose distribution across economic sectors was proportional to the distribution of the 
country’s labor force across sectors, excluding agriculture.  They were then asked to 
choose firms randomly within these broad sectors (for example, by choosing firms at 
regular intervals from an alphabetic list), and to pursue face-to-face interviews, following 
up for clarifications where necessary.  The employment distribution was taken from data 
in the 1998 Yearbook of Labour Statistics of the International Labour Office.  The 
respondents to the survey are typically a company’s CEO or a member of its senior 
management.” 
 
The WCY uses a 115 question survey sent to executives in top and middle management 
of firms in all 49 countries of the WCY.  The sample size of each country is proportional 
to GDP, and firms "normally have an international dimension."  The firms are selected to 
be a cross section of manufacturing, service, and primary industries.  There were 3532 
responses to the Survey. 
 
KKZ (2002) updates the data on governance that were developed in Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) “Governance Matters.”  The database contain more than 300 
governance indicators for 175 countries compiled from a variety of sources in 2000/2001.  
Six aggregate indicators are constructed corresponding to six basic governance concepts:  
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.   
 
  The various raw data series were chosen because of their relevance to the four 
concepts of trade facilitation. 
 
  Port efficiency for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs (all GCR):  
o  Port facilities and inland waterways are :(1=underdeveloped, 7=as developed 
as the world's best, GCR) 
o  Air transport is :(1=infrequent and inefficient, 7=as extensive and efficient as 
the world's best, GCR) 
 
  Customs environment for each country J is the average of two indexed inputs (all 
GCR):  
o  Hidden import barriers other than published tariffs and quotas    24
o  Irregular extra payments or bribes connected with import and export permits 
 
  Regulatory environment for each country J is constructed as the average of four 
indexed inputs: 
o  Transparency of government policy is satisfactory (WCY) 
o  Control of Corruption (KKZ) 
 
  Service sector infrastructure for each country J is as the average of three indexed 
inputs (all GCR): 
o  Speed and cost of internet access are: (1=slow and expensive, 7=fast and 
cheap) 
o  Internet contribution to reduce inventory costs is: (1=no improvement, 7=huge 
improvement)  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Values of Trade Facilitation Indicators 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, 






Category Indexed  inputs  Source Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min 
Min. 
Importer  Max 
Max. 
Importer 
Port Efficiency  Ports Facilities  GCR  .636 .189 .261 Bolivia 1.000  Singapore 
   Air Transport   GCR  .710 .166 .229
Slovak 
Republic 1.000  Singapore 
Aggregate Index    .673 .169 .345 Bolivia  1.000  Singapore 
Customs Environment Hidden Import Barriers   GCR  .702 .167 .368 Paraguay 1.000 Finland 
   Bribery GCR  .689 .175 .343 Bangladesh  1.000  Iceland 





Transparency of Government 
Policies  WCY .619 .205 .089 Argentina  1.000  Finland 
   Control of Corruption  KKZ  .746 .140 .530 South Africa  1.000  Finland 
Aggregate Index      .689 .139 .353 Venezuela  1.000  Finland 
Service sector 
infrastructure  Speed and Costs of Internet Access  GCR .629 .162 .348 Vietnam  1.000  Finland 
 Effect on Internet on Business  GCR .719 .102 .481 Greece 1.000  Finland 
Aggregate Index    .674 .121 .482 Mauritius 1.000 Finland   29
 





Source: Authors’ calculation based on Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
Figure 2: Two Indexed inputs to customs environment
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Figure 1: Two Indexed inputs to Port Efficiency
0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000
Africa
East Asia
Europe and Central Asia




Air transport (higher is
better)
Inland waterways (higher




Figure 3: Two Indexed Inputs to Regulatory Environment











Source: Authors’ calculation based on Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) and 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
 
Figure 4: Two Indexed inputs to Service-Sector Infrastructure
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 Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables for Gravity Model 
 


























1              
Tariff 
 
-0.154  1            
Port Efficiency 
 
0.239  -0.311  1         
Customs  Environment  0.221  -0.335  0.767  1         
Regulatory 
Environment 
0.078  -0.295  0.600  0.709  1        
Service sector 
infrastructure 
0.255  -0.362  0.784  0.762  0.608  1       
GNP of Importer 
 
0.444  -0.171  0.444  0.398  0.064  0.490  1      
GNP of Exporter 
 
0.614 -0.024 -0.040  -0.051 -0.015 -0.051 -0.064  1       
Per capita GNP of 
Importer 
0.255  -0.399 0.795  0.858 0.570 0.787 0.491 -0.055  1     
Per capita GNP of 
Exporter 
0.399 -0.099 -0.026  -0.031 -0.009 -0.032 -0.036 0.504 -0.035  1   
Distance 
 
-0.364 0.063 -0.091  -0.128 -0.081 -0.074 -0.019 0.013 -0.129 -0.115  1 
Source: Authors’ calculation.   32
Table 3: Regression Results  
  Model 1  Model 2 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Constant    -10.641*** 1.558 -10.771*** 1.549 
Tariff Rates   -1.155***  0.318  -1.163***  0.318 
Port Efficiency of Importer     0.307*  0.163  0.338*  0.160 
Port Efficiency of Exporter    0.924***  0.148  0.938***  0.146 
Customs Environment of Importer 0.472**  0.199  0.486*  0.199 
Regulatory Envornment of Importer     0.281*  0.144  0.264  0.144 
Regulatory Envornment of Exporter    0.620***  0.132  0.580***  0.131 
Service sector infrastructure of Importer    0.729***  0.224  0.657**  0.224 
Service sector infrastructure of Exporter    1.943***  0.216  1.943***  0.217 
GNP of Importer    0.915***  0.014  0.915***  0.014 
Per capita GNP of Importer  -0.182***  0.037  -0.210***  0.037 
GNP of Exporter   1.246***  0.014  1.241***  0.014 
Per capita GNP of Exporter  -0.226***  0.029  -0.251***  0.029 
Geographical Distance  -1.258*** 0.025  -1.225***  0.025 
Adjacency dummy   0.336***  0.114  0.426***  0.108 
Membership Dummy for any FTA      -0.021  0.078 
ASEAN Membership Dummy   0.509***  0.190     
NAFTA Membership Dummy    -0.645   0.501     
LAIA Membership Dummy   0.593***  0.154     
AUNZ Membership Dummy     1.118  0.858    
MERCOSUR Membership Dummy     0.229  0.302    
EU Membership Dummy    -0.515***  0.106    
Dummy for any Common Language       0.823***  0.061 
English Language Dummy   0.808***  0.089     
French Language Dummy   -1.413***  0.500    
Spanish Language Dummy   0.598***  0.098    
Arabic Language Dummy   -1.223  0.992    
Chinese Language Dummy     1.747***  0.406    
German Language Dummy    -0.826  0.505    
Portuguese Language Dummy     0.569  0.986    
Russian Language Dummy     2.026***  0.362    
Year 2000 dummy    -0.031  0.039  -0.038  0.039 
Adjusted R-squared  0.758    0.755  
Number of the observations  7,904    7,904  
Note: The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, recpectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 4: Regression Results (South to South and South to North Trade) 
  Full sample   South to north 
trade  
South to south 
trade  
Tariff rates  -1.555***  -1.512  -1.5*** 
Port Efficiency of Importing Country  0.307*  0.344  -0.283 
Port Efficiency of Exporting Country  0.924***  0.845***  0.949*** 
Customs Environment of Importing Country  0.472**  1.041  0.202 
Regulatory Environment of Importing Country  0.281*  -1.120*  0.816*** 
Regulatory Environment of Exporting Country  0.620***  2.437***  0.827*** 
Service sector infrastructure of Importing Country  0.729***  2.134***  0.866 
Service sector infrastructure of Exporting Country  1.943***  2.124***  3.133*** 
Adjusted R-squared   0.758  0.702  0.649 
Number of the observations  7,904  2,188  3,094 
Note: The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, recpectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Table 5. The Effect of Port Efficiency by Geographical Characteristics  
Port Efficiency of Importer  0.333**  0.311*  0.368**  0.303*  0.357** 
  (0.165) (0.163) (0.164) (0.165)  (0.166) 
Landlockedness* Port Efficiency of Importer  -0.157      -0.128  -0.126 
 (0.783)      (0.783)  (0.781) 
Island* Port Efficiency of Importer    1.198**    1.223**  1.307** 
   (0.604)    (0.606)  (0.605) 
Adjacency* Port Efficiency of Importer      -1.360***    -1.333*** 
     (0.409)    (0.410) 
Port Efficiency of Exporter  0.940***  0.866***  1.007***  0.982***  1.057*** 
  (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150)  (0.150) 
Landlockedness* Port Efficiency of Exporter  0.268      0.229  0.424 
 (0.836)      (0.835)  (0.835) 
Island* Port Efficiency of Exporter    -2.000***    -2.107***  -2.038*** 
   (0.612)    (0.614)  (0.612) 
Adjacency* Port Efficiency of Exporter    -1.582***    -1.592*** 
     (0.388)    (0.389) 
Customs Environment of Importer  0.461**  0.461**  0.431**  0.444**  0.402** 
    (0.200) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200)  (0.199) 
Regulatory Envornment of Importer  0.283**  0.294**  0.279*  0.288**  0.287** 
    (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144)  (0.143) 
Regulatory Envornment of Exporter  0.619***  0.608***  0.607***  0.624***  0.610*** 
    (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)  (0.132) 
Service sector infrastructure of Importer  0.713***  0.745***  0.753***  0.764***  0.791*** 
    (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225)  (0.225) 
Service sector infrastructure of Exporter  1.936***  2.002***  1.944***  1.867***  1.874*** 
    (0.217) (0.218) (0.216) (0.218)  (0.217) 
Tariff Rates  -1.161*** -1.239*** -1.127*** -1.205***  -1.177*** 
  (0.319) (0.318) (0.318) (0.318)  (0.318) 
Landlockedness Dummy  0.328      0.324  0.386 
 (0.794)      (0.793  (0.791) 
Island Dummy    -0.260    -0.263  -0.222 
   (0.483)    (0.370)  (0.370)   
Adjacency Dummy  0.329***  0.331*** -0.955*** 0.329***  -0.953*** 
  (0.114) (0.113) (0.235) (0.114)  (0.235) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.759 0.761 0.760 0.760  0.761 
Note: The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, recpectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.   35
Table 6. Robustness Check for the OLS Estimator 
Variable OLS  Huber/WhiteHuber/WhiteHuber/White  WLS WLS 
Tariff Rates  -1.155*** -1.155*** -1.155  -1.155** -1.467***  -0.483**
   (0.318)  (0.399) (0.868) (0.561)  (0.343)  (0.246) 
Port Efficiency of Importer  0.307* 0.307*  0.307  0.307  0.246  0.473***
   (0.163)  (0.161) (0.414) (0.204)  (0.157)  (0.119) 
Port Efficiency of Exporter  0.924*** 0.924*** 0.924***  0.924  0.913***  0.537***
   (0.148)  (0.166) (0.179) (0.978)  (0.142)  (0.137) 
Customs Environment of Importer  0.472** 0.472**  0.472  0.472*  0.472**  1.112***
   (0.199)  (0.198) (0.480) (0.259)  (0.193)  (0.147) 
Regulatory Envornment of Importer  0.281* 0.281**  0.281  0.281* 0.288**  -0.069 
   (0.144)  (0.141) (0.304) (0.145)  (0.138)  (0.107) 
Regulatory Envornment of Exporter  0.620*** 0.620*** 0.620***  0.620  0.594*** 0.180 
   (0.132)  (0.144) (0.163) (0.867)  (0.127)  (0.118) 
Service sector infrastructure of Importer  0.729*** 0.729*** 0.729 0.729***  0.647***  0.494***
   (0.224)  (0.241) (0.771) (0.262)  (0.227)  (0.166) 
Service sector infrastructure of Exporter  1.943*** 1.943*** 1.943***  1.943  1.831***  2.336***
   (0.216)  (0.234) (0.242) (1.270)  (0.208)  (0.189) 
GNP of Importer  0.915*** 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.915***  0.931***  0.892***
   (0.014)  (0.015) (0.044) (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.010) 
Per capita GNP of Importer  -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.182* -0.182*** -0.183***  -0.227***
   (0.037)  (0.038) (0.099) (0.056)  (0.037)  (0.028) 
GNP of Exporter  1.246*** 1.246*** 1.246*** 1.246***  1.239***  1.169***
   (0.014)  (0.015) (0.020) (0.082)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
Per capita GNP of Exporter  -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226***  -0.226 -0.231***  -0.153***
   (0.029)  (0.030) (0.032) (0.197)  (0.028)  (0.022) 
Geographical Distance  -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.258*** -1.238***  -1.143***
  (0.025)  (0.022) (0.048) (0.092)  (0.025)  (0.018) 
Robust Standard Error  No  Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Cluster    No  Importer  Exporter     
Weighted  Least  Square        Yes  Yes 
  Cluster          Importer  Exporter
Adjusted R-squared  0.759  0.759 0.759 0.759     
Chi-squared against all b being zero          26,755  38,700 
Note: The significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by “*”, “**”, and “***”, recpectively. 







Figure 5: Changes in Trade Facilitation Measures to Have an Equivalent Increase in 











Source: Authors’ calculation.  37
Figure 6: Simulation Analysis: Improvements in Trade Facilitation and Change in 
Trade Flows 
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Table 7: Overview of Simulation: Bring Below-Average Members Half-way up to 
the Global Average (Change in Trade Flow in $ billion) 
 
 Importer’s 
change in trade 
facilitation 
Exporter’s 
change in trade 
facilitation 
Total  
‘Border’ Measures     
Port Efficiency  23.40 (0.6%)  84.53 (2.2%)  106.93 (2.8%) 
Customs Environment  32.87 (0.8%)    32.87 (0.8%) 
     
‘Inside-the Border’ 
Measures 
   
Service sector 
infrastructure  
36.64 (0.9%)  117.38 (3.0%)  154.02 (4.0%) 
Regulatory 
Environment 
24.39 (0.6%)  58.86 (1.5%)  83.25 (2.1%) 
     
Grand Total  117.30 (3.0%)  259.77 (6.7%)  377.06 (9.7%) 
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Table 8:  Detail of Simulation Results   
 
--Experience of Exporters 
   Port  efficiency 
Customs 







































East Asia  753 0.5 7.0 7.6 0.8 0.6 3.3 3.9 0.9  10.8 11.7 24.0
East Europe and Central Asia  139 0.8 8.7 9.5 0.9 0.7 5.5 6.1 1.4  12.1 13.5 30.0
Latin America and Caribbean  179 0.6 7.3 7.9 0.9 0.8 3.6 4.4 0.8 6.0 6.8 20.0
Middle East and North Africa  26 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7 1.4 3.3
OECD  2735 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 3.8
South Asia  36 0.4  11.7  12.1 0.8 0.5 6.9 7.4 0.7  19.2 20.0 40.3
Sub-Saharan Africa  12 0.4 1.1 1.4 0.6 0.5 2.8 3.3 0.8 4.8 5.6 10.9
Total  3879 0.6 2.2 2.8 0.8 0.6 1.5 2.1 0.9 3.0 4.0 9.7
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
--Experience of Importers 
   Port  efficiency 
Customs 







































East Asia  620 1.5 2.7 4.2 2.2 1.1 2.1 3.3 2.7 4.4 7.0 16.7
East Europe and Central Asia  165 3.1 1.8 4.9 3.2 2.7 1.3 4 5.3 2.4 7.7 19.8
Latin America and Caribbean  260 2.9 1.3 4.2 3.4 2.4 1.4 3.8 2.9 1.8 4.7 16.1
Middle East and North Africa  32 0.2 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.1 1.1 1.2 0.7 2.1 2.8 6.6
OECD  2761 0.0 2.2 2.2 0.1 0.2 1.4 1.6 0.1 2.9 3.0 6.9
South Asia  21 3.1 1.4 4.5 5.8 3.3 1.5 4.8 6.8 2.5 9.3 24.4
Sub-saharan Africa  20 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.0 1.8 1.3 3.1 3.5 2.6 6.1 15.2
Total  3879 0.6 2.2 2.8 0.8 0.6 1.5 2.1 0.9 3.0 4.0 9.7
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 































 Source: Authors’ calculation.   40
 
Figure 9:  Change in Manufacturing Exports ‘Half-way to the Global Average’ 













































































































































Source: Authors’ calculation.     Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 

































































































Source: Authors’ calculation.     Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 